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It is well known that risk increases the value of options. This paper
makes that precise in a new way. The conventional theorem says that the
value of an option does not fall if the underlying option becomes riskier in the
conventional sense of the mean-preserving spread. This paper uses two new
de¯nitions of \riskier" to show that the value of an option strictly increases
(a) if the underlying asset becomes \pointwise riskier," and (b) only if the
underlying asset becomes \extremum riskier."
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A call option is the right to buy the asset at a strike price, P. It has
been well known at least since Merton (1973) that the value of a call option
increases with the riskiness of the underlying asset. If extra risk increases
the probability that the market price exceeds P, then the value of the option
increases. A standard ¯nance text says
\The holder of a call option will prefer more variance in the price of
the stock to less. The greater the variance, the greater the probability
that the stock price will exceed the exercise price, and this is of value
to the call holder." (Copeland & Weston, 3rd edition, p. 243)
But this is not quite correct, despite being the sort of thing that even
experts say in conversation and in textbooks. As I am sure Thomas Copeland
and Fred Weston knew as they wrote this passage, it quite possible for the
risk and variance of the underlying asset to increase while the value of the
option remains does not increase. The value will not fall, but it might remain
unchanged. Suppose the strike price is $50 and the current price of the asset
is $40.If the probability of the price being between $10 and $15 or $45 and
$49 increases, while the probability it is between $38 and $42 falls, the asset
has become riskier, but there is no e®ect on the option value, because the
probabilities of asset values above the strike price of $50 have not changed.
This, too, is well-known, but it leaves open the question of what kind of
risk does actually increase thevalueof options. It is false, strictly speaking, to
say that additional risk increases the value. On the other hand it is true but
uninteresting to say that additional risk does not reduce the value. A great
many variables do not reduce the value of an option, usually because they
never a®ect the value either way. For introductory textbooks no great harm
is done in stating a risk-value proposition loosely, but it is worth thinking
about how we can come up with a proposition for this basic intuition that is
both interesting and true.
One way out is to surrender generality in the kinds of asset distribu-
tions that we describe. Bliss (2001), noting the problem of coming up with
2a rigorous proposition, points out that a su±cient condition for option value
to increase with risk is that the underlying asset value have a two-parameter
distribution such as the normal or lognormal. The relationships between
option value and risk, however, clearly holds for much more general distri-
butions. (Bliss's attention in that article is about a di®erent problem, also
trivially solved by restricting attention to normal distributions{ what to do
when the underlying assets cannot be ordered using the standard de¯nition
of risk.)
The options literature has travelled down the route of studying par-
ticular stochastic processes for asset returns{ di®usion or jump processes{
rather than looking at general distributions for end-states as Merton (1973)
did. This began with the log-normal di®usion processes of Fischer Black
and Myron Scholes (1973) and continued with such generalizations as John
Cox & Stephen Ross (1976) and Merton (1976) More recent entries in the
literature include Yaacov Bergman, Bruce Grundy & Zvi Wiener (1996) and
Masaaki Kijima (2002). Other papers look at other considerations absent
in the simplest model of one underlying asset, risk-neutral investors, and
zero transaction costs. Ravi Jagannathan (1984), for example, looks at val-
ues when investors are not risk neutral, and value wealth more in particular
states of the world. In such a situation, a riskier asset might not have a
higher option value because the option might yield its highest returns in a
state of the world when investors are wealthier anyway and hence value the
return less. While the \extreme value theory" of, e.g., Chavez-Demoulin &
Embrechts (2004) has turned to looking at the e®ects of unusual events on
¯nancial valuation, it is oriented towards estimation ofthe value of particular
assets.
In this article I will return to the original problem of how risk a®ects
option value, but from a di®erent direction. First, we will see that if the un-
derlying asset becomes riskier, then we can at least say that for some strike
prices a call option will become more valuable{ a very simple result, but
worth noting. (I will use call options rather than put options throughout,
but the proofs easily extend to puts.) Second, I will show that only if the
underlying asset becomes riskier in the special way I call \extremum riskier"
3will every call option will rise in value regardless of the strike price- a neces-
sary condition for a rise in value. Third, I will show that if the underlying
asset becomes riskier in the special way I call \pointwise riskier" then ev-
ery call option will rise in value regardless of the strike price{ a su±cient
condition for a rise in value.
This paper's main contribution is as a tidying up of one of the funda-
mental ideas in ¯nance theory. In ¯nance modelling, it may be useful for
those analysts who do not wish to assume normality of asset returns, par-
ticularly in real option theory, where option value enters only as part of a
larger model of business decisionmaking (see, e.g. Dixit & Pindyck [1994]
or section 25.6 of Gollier [2001]). The de¯nitions here{ and, in particular,
the de¯nition of \pointwise risk," may also be useful in other areas of eco-
nomics. The paper's inspiration was an application in auction theory, to
be able to derive a proposition that a bidder would be more willing to pay
to acquire information if his initial uncertainty over the value of the object
being auctioned was greater (see Rasmusen [2004]). Option value enters as
a component with interesting comparative statics in other applications too.
As long ago as Arrow & Fischer (1974) the idea was applied to cost-bene¯t
analysis in environmental projects with irreversibility. Search theory is an-
other application; see Weitzman (1979) for a classic model in which the value
of searches increases with uncertainty, or Varian (1999) for a more recent ar-
ticle. For such models it may be useful to identify assumptions on changes
in distributions so that propositions can be found that say when a change
in uncertainty strictly increases the payo® from the option-creating action
rather than just not reducing the payo®.
II. The Model
Let there be an asset which has terminal value xi with probability f(xi),
where the values of xi with positive probability are x1 < x2 < ::: < xm.
Denote by Vcall(f;p) the current value of a call option on that asset with
strike price p such that x1 < p < xm: This rules out strike prices of x1 or
below and xm and above, because they would lead to riskless options which
would be exercised always or never. It does allow a strike price that does
4not happen to equal any of the xi. The call option entitles its owner to
buy the asset at price p at the terminal time if he wishes. We will assume
the discount rate is zero and use only two dates, the current date and the
terminal date, to avoid distraction by the many issues that would otherwise
arise (the date of exercise, di®usion versus jump processes, the time value
of money, dividend payments, and so forth). Instead, our focus is on seeing
how the option value would change if the underlying asset followed a di®erent











where xm+1 < xm+2 < ::: < xn are points in the support of g but not f. This
allows, for example, xm+1 < x1, which says that g can have positive proba-
bility on x values less than or greater than the support of f(x), or on values
between x's in f(x)'s support. Let us denote the cumulative distributions by
F(x) and G(x).








f(xi)(xi ¡ p) where j : xj¡1 < p < xj
(2)
De¯ning Risk
The standard de¯nition of risk is based on the idea of the \mean- pre-
serving spread," which we can de¯ne as follows.
De¯nition 1a: A mean-preserving spread consists of three numbers
s(y1), s(y2), and s(y3) for y1 < y2 < y3 such that
s(y1)y1 + s(y2)y2 + s(y3)y3 = 0; (the mean is preserved) (3)
5s(y1) + s(y2) + s(y3) = 0; (the new probabilities sum to zero) (4)
and
s(y1) > 0; s(y2) < 0; s(y3) > 0 (the probability is spread) (5)
De¯nition 1a is specialized to discrete probability distributions, and it
uses the idea of the \3-point mean-preserving spread," developed in Petrakis
& Rasmusen (1994) rather than the conventional \4-point mean-preserving
spread" of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970), which has negative probability at
two middle points rather than one. The two de¯nitions of spread lead to
equivalent de¯nitions of risk. De¯nition 1b below orders distributions by
risk identically whichever de¯nition of spread is used. The 3-point de¯nition
is simpler and will lead to less clutter in proofs (as well as allowing an easy
¯x of the error in the main proof in Rothschild & Stiglitz [1970]). Note that
De¯nition 1a does not require that the yi equal any xi: the spread can put
positive probability on asset values which originally have zero probability.
Formally, a spread added to f(x) also could result in probabilities that are
negative or greater than one, but nobody would want to use such a spread.
Thus, we arrive at De¯nition 1b, the de¯nition of risk originated in
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970) (with earlier suggestions in Hadar & Russell
[1969] and Hanoch & Levy [1969]).
De¯nition 1b: Distribution g(x) is riskier than f(x) i® g(x) can be reached
from f(x) by a sequence of mean-preserving spreads.
This de¯nition of risk has long been conventional, since it is equivalent
to saying that the asset becomes less attractive to a risk- averse investor
(one with a concave utility function) or that f is like g with noise added,
although De¯nition 1b is only a partial ordering, and many pairs of distribu-
tions cannot be ranked by it. In the option context, Bliss (2001) shows the
importance of using De¯nition 1b instead of de¯ning risk as simply higher
variance, which is not an equivalent de¯nition. Variance can increase without
making an asset less attractive to a risk-averse investor, and option values
6do not change in a uniform direction with changes in variance.1
It is perhaps worth reminding the reader of another statement of risk: in
terms of stochastic dominance. Distribution F(x) \¯rst-order stochastically
dominates" distribution F(x) if F(t) · G(t) for all t, i.e., if G puts more
probability on lower values of x than F does. Distribution F \second-order




0 G(x)dx for all t,
with the inequality strict for at least one value of t.2 A de¯nition of risk
that is equivalent to De¯nition 1b is that distribution G(x) is riskier than
F(x) if F(x) second-order stochastically dominates G(x). We will use den-
sities rather than cumulative distributions in this article, however, because
densities are easier to visualize and understand.
Option Value Does Not Decline with Risk
The fundamental proposition in the theory of risk and options is the
well- known Proposition 1: option value is weakly increasing in risk.
Proposition 1 (Merton [1970] Theorem 8, p. 149): If g is riskier than
f, then Vcall(f;p) · Vcall(g;p) for any p.
1An example to show that increased variance can increase utility for a risk-averse person
is the following. Let the utility be U = x for x · 10 U = 10 + x=2 for x ¸ 10, which is
weakly concave. Suppose wealth is initially distributed as f: (.8-7, .2-12), which has mean
8, variance 4(= :8¤12+:2¤42), and utility 7:8(= :8¤7+:2¤11). If the distribution is changed
to g: (.2- 0, .8-10), the mean is still 8, the variance increases to 16(= :2 ¤ 82 + :8 ¤ 22),
and utility rises to 8(= :2 ¤0 +:8 ¤10). Kurtosis, which increases when moving weight to
the tails of the distribution, is equally unreliable for ranking the riskiness of distributions;
it starts as 52(= :8 ¤ 14 + :2 ¤ 44) in this example and rises to 832(= :2 ¤ 84 + :8 ¤ 24):
Note, too, that option value can rise with variance but does not necessarily do so: in this
example, VCall(f;11) = :2(12 ¡11) = :2 but VCall(g;11) = 0.
2 There is some scope for ambiguity here in whether the inequalities are weak or strong.
Three levels that might be de¯ned are \weak stochastic dominance," in which it is possible
that the inequality is an equality for all t, so F and G are identical; \semiweak stochastic
dominance," in which the inequality must be strict for at least one value of t; and \strict
stochastic dominance," in which the inequality must be strict for all values of t. Weak
and semiweak stochastic dominance are what are standardly used in economic theorems.
See, too, footnote 4 below.




f(xi)(xi ¡ p) where j : xj¡1 < p < xj (6)
and the value of the call on the riskier asset, g, is
Vcall(g;p) = f(xi)(xi ¡ p) + s(y1)Max(y1 ¡ p;0) + s(y2)Max(y2 ¡ p;0) + s(y3)Max(y3 ¡ p;0):
(7)
If
0 · s(y1)Max(y1 ¡ p;0) + s(y2)Max(y2 ¡ p;0) + s(y3)Max(y3 ¡ p;0):
(8)
then Proposition 1 is correct.
From de¯nition equation (3), the spread is mean-preserving, so s(y1)y1+
s(y2)y2 + s(y3)y3 = 0, and by equation (4) the spread's probabilities add to
zero, so [s(y1) + s(y2) + s(y3)] = 0. Together, these imply that
s(y1)(y1 ¡ p) + s(y2)(y2 ¡ p) + s(y3)(y3 ¡ p) = s(y1)(y1) + s(y2)(y2) + s(y3)(y3)
¡[s(y1) + s(y2) + s(y3)]p = 0;
(9)
a result that will be used below.
(i) Suppose p · y1, so inequality (8) becomes
0 · s(y1)(y1 ¡ p) + s(y2)(y2 ¡ p) + s(y3)(y3 ¡ p): (10)
Equation (9) tells us that this is true as an equality.
(ii) Suppose p ¸ y3, so inequality (8) becomes
0 · s(y1)(0) + s(y2)(0) + s(y3)(0): (11)
This is obviously true as an equality.
8(iii) Suppose that p 2 (y1;y3). Then, since Max(y1¡p;0) = 0 and Max(y3¡
p;0) = y3 ¡ p, we can rewrite expression (7) as
0 · 0 + s(y2)Max(y2 ¡ p;0) + s(y3)(y3 ¡ p) (12)
(a) If Max(y2 ¡ p;0) = 0, then inequality (12) is true as a strict inequality,
since s(y3) > 0 and y3 > p.
(b) If Max(y2 ¡ p;0) = y2 ¡ p, then inequality (12) is true if
s(y2)(y2 ¡ p) + s(y3)(y3 ¡ p) ¸ 0 (13)
Equation (9) tells us that s(y1)(y1 ¡ p) + s(y2)(y2 ¡ p) + s(y3)(y3 ¡ p) = 0,
so since s(y1) > 0 and, in case (iii), (y1 ¡ p) < 0, it follows that (12) is true
as a strict inequality. Q. E. D.
Compare Proposition 1 with Proposition 1a, which di®ers only in the strength
of the inequality.
Proposition 1a (false): If g is riskier than f, then Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p)
for any strike price p.
Disproof. Consider a call option with an exercise price of 4.5 and the asset
price distribution shown in Figure 1. Vcall(f;4:5) = Vcall(g;4:5), even though
g is riskier than f. The increase in risk has no e®ect because only changes
in the probabilities of terminal values greater than 4.5 would matter to the
value of the call, and there are no such changes in the example.
9Figure 1: A Counterexample: Risk Does Not Increase Option
Value
Propositions 1 and 1a di®er only in the weakness of the inequality. That
is enough, however, for \Proposition 1a: Option value increases with risk" to
be false. Instead, we are left with \Proposition 1: Option value does not fall
with risk," which although true, is very weak. That kind of statement can
be made of any variable outside the model: \Option value does not fall with
wealth," or \Option value does not fall with unemployment," or \Option
value does not fall with the temperature in Bloomington."
The statement \Option value does not fall with risk," however, though
it does translate the mathematical notation of Proposition 1, is unnecessarily
weak. We can instead say that \Option value does not fall with risk, and for
at least one value of the strike price it increases." Propostion 1b expresses
this in mathematical notation.
Proposition 1b: If g is riskier than f, then there exists some exercise price
p0 such that the associated call option is more valuable under g than under f
but no exercise price p00 such that a call option is more valuable under f:
109p0 : Vcall(f;p0) < Vcall(g;p0);
but
6 9p00 : Vcall(f;p00) > Vcall(g;p00).
Proof:
The proof of Proposition 1 showed that if p 2 (y1;y3), then the value of the
call strictly increases. Thus, simply pick p0 in (y1;y3) for one of the spreads
that makes g riskier than f.
That there exists no value p00 for which option value declines is a direct
corollary of Proposition 1. QED.
IIb. New De¯nitions of Risk
Another approach is to ¯nd a de¯nition of risk under which something
like Proposition 1b is true, and the value of the option does increase with
\risk" regardless of the strike price.
De¯nition 2 (new): Distribution g(x) is pointwise riskier than f(x) i® f
and g have the same mean and there exist points x and x in (x1;xm) such that
(a) if x < x, then g(x) ¸ f(x) and if f(x) > 0 then g(x) > f(x);
(b) if x 2 [x;x], then g(x) · f(x) and if f(x) > 0 then g(x) < f(x);
(c) if x > x, then g(x) ¸ f(x) and if f(x) > 0 then g(x) > f(x).
De¯nition 2 says that g(x) is pointwise riskier than f(x) if it takes
probability away from each point in the middle of the distribution and adds
probability to each point at the two ends, while preserving the mean. Dis-
tribution g1(x) in Figure 2 is an example. De¯nition 2 also allows g(x) to
add probability to points outside the interval [x1;xm]{ that is, beyond the
two extremes of the support of f(x). Pointwise riskiness captures something
of the same intuition as the idea of the mean-preserving spread{ that prob-
ability is to be moved from the middle to the ends of the distribution. If g
is pointwise riskier than f, it is also riskier in the conventional sense. Note
11that the change from f to g need not be symmetric around the mean of the
distribution, nor uniform even within the xi each of the three regions [¡1;x]
[x;x], [x;1]. The pointwise riskier distribution g might, for example, begin
with a uniform f and then add .05 to f(x1), :01 to f(x2), and .20 to f(x3),
reduce probability on f over [x4;x9], and then increase probability again over
[x10;x20], so long as it preserves the mean of f. Every point on the \sides"
must gain probability, but not necessarily the same amount of probability,
nor must more extreme points gain more probability than less extreme ones.3
Figure 2: Pointwise and Extremum Riskiness
Pointwise riskiness will be su±cient but not necessary for option value to
increase with risk for all strike prices, as we will see in Proposition 5 once we
have derived other results useful in proving su±ciency.4 Distribution g2(x)
3The de¯nition of pointwise riskiness can be modi¯ed easily for continuous densities f
and g with convex and bounded support{ that is, with an interval as a support with no
gaps at which the de¯nition would require g to have negative density.
4 Since pointwise riskiness and second-order stochastic dominance both can be de¯ned
in terms of functions that cross a limited number of times, the reader may wonder if
pointwise riskiness is the same as the strict second-order stochastic dominance of footnote
12in Figure 2 is an example in which g is not pointwise riskier than f, but
Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p) nonetheless for all p.
If p is ¯xed, g(x) does not even have to be a mean- preserving spread to
increase the value of the call. But we are asking what changes to the asset
distribution will increase the value of any call written on the asset.
Our other new de¯nition of risk is one which is necessary for extra risk
to increase option value: extremum risk.The de¯nition of extremum riskiness
would need modi¯cation for bounded continuous distributions. A de¯nition
in terms of cumulative distributions is then more convenient, if less intuitive:
g is extremum-riskier than f if G(x1 + ²) > F(x1 + ²) and 1 ¡ G(xm ¡ ²) <
1 ¡ F(xm ¡ ²) for arbitrarily small ². Cumulative distributions must be
used because if f is a continuous density then each of the extrema has zero
probability, even if positive density, and to change the value of an option it is
necessary to change probabilities over an interval of f's support, not just over
one point. Thus, g must put more probability on the intervals [¡1;x1 + ²]
and [xm ¡ ²;1].
De¯nition 3 (new): Distribution g(x) is extremum riskier than f(x)
i®
(a) either f(x1) < g(x1), or g(x) > 0 for some x < x1;
and
(b)either f(xm) < g(xm), or g(x) > 0 for some x > xm.
The distribution in part (c) of Figure 2 is extremum-riskier than the
distributions in parts (a) and (b). The distribution in part (b) of Figure 3 is
extremum-riskier than the distribution in part (a).




0 F(x)dx for all values of t such that G(t) > 0 and G(t) < 1. It could be, however, that
G is pointwise riskier than F without F strictly second-order dominating G. Suppose,
for example, that F is uniform, with F(1) = :25;F(2) = :5;F(3) = :75;F(4) = 1 and G
moves weight from the middle to the tails and is pointwise riskier so G(1) = :30;G(2) =
:5;F(3) = :7;F(4) = 1. If we de¯ne DF(t) ´
R t
0 F(x)dx (and similarly for G) then
DF(1) = :25;DF(2) = :75;DF(3) = 1:5 and DG(1) = :30;DG(2) = :8;DG(3) = 1:5. Since
DF(3) = DG(3), F does not strictly dominate G. F does weakly dominate G, as we would
expect since G is riskier in the conventional sense.
13Figure 3: Extremum Risk versus Risk
Proposition 2: Consider two distributions f and g. A necessary condition
for it to be true that Vcall(g;p) > Vcall(f;p) for any strike price p is that g be
extremum-riskier than f.
Proof:
Hold p ¯xed. If f(x) and g(x) are identical for all x > p or for all x < p,
then Vcall(g;p) = Vcall(f;p).
(i) We will start with condition (b) in De¯nition 3. If f and g are
identical for all x > p, then clearly the call value of equation (2) must be
equal for f and g, since then f and g are identical for x ¸ xj, and only such




f(xi)(xi ¡ p) where j : xj¡1 < p < xj (14)
Thus, for Vcall(g;p) > Vcall(f;p) to be true, it is necessary that g(x) >
f(x) for some x > p.
14Since this is true for every p, it must be true for p = xm ¡ ², for any
small value ². Thus, for some x ¸ xm, g(x) > f(x). But this can be true only
if either g(xm) > f(xm), or if g(x) > 0 for some x > xm. That is condition





g(xi)(xi ¡ p) +
n X
i=k
g(xi)(xi ¡ p) >
m X
i=j
f(xi)(xi ¡ p) = Vcall(f;p)
where j : xj¡1 < p < xj; k : xk¡1 < p < xk
(15)
The distributions f and g have equal means, so
Eg(x) ¡ p =
m X
i=1
g(xi)(xi ¡ p) +
n X
i=m+1
g(xi)(xi ¡ p) =
m X
i=1
f(xi)(xi ¡ p) = Ef(x) ¡ p
where j : xj¡1 < p < xj; k : xk¡1 < p < xk
(16)
Subtracting, we know that




g(xi)(xi ¡ p) +
k¡1 X
i=m+1




where j : xj¡1 < p < xj; k : xk¡1 < p < xk
(18)
15Now set set p = x1 + ² for some small number ². Inequality (18) becomes
g(x1)(x1 ¡ p) +
k¡1 X
i=m+1
g(xi)(xi ¡ p) < f(x1)(x1 ¡ p)
where j : xj¡1 < p < xj; k : xk¡1 < p < xk:
(19)
Both sides of this inequality are negative, since x < p over the range of xi it
includes, so the inequality implies that either g(x1) > f(x1) or that g(x) > 0
for some x < x1. That is condition (a) in De¯nition 3.
Thus, for the value of the call to be greater under g(x) for all p, it is
necessary that g satisfy the conditions for being extremum riskier than f.
QED.
We can now better discuss one part of the de¯nition of extremum risk-
iness that may have puzzled the reader: why does it require that g add
probability at both extremes, not just the maximum? The answer is not that
the de¯nition has been crafted for application to puts as well as to calls; it
turns out that even as a necessary condition for calls to become more valuable
with extremum riskiness, we need proability to increase at both extremes.
This was, of course, needed in the proof of Proposition 2, but a numerical
example will aid intuition.
The example, shown in in Figure 4, in which g is made riskier than f by
shifting probability away from x = 2, the mean, to x = 1:33 and x = 4:67.
So doing makes g put more probability than f on the upper extremum of
x = 4:67, but no more probability on the lower extremum of x = 0:
A call with a strike price above 1.33 will increase in value as a result of
changing the distribution from f to g. But think about a call with a strike
price of 1. It will have equal value under f and g, because the mean of
the distribution conditional on x being greater than 1 has not changed. Or,
looked at a bit di®erently, the probability of the state of the world (x = 0)
in which the call is not exercised has not changed at all.
16Figure 4: Why Extremum Risk Needs Spread at Both Extrema
The general problem is that unless both extrema are increased in g, it
is possible to ¯nd a strike price such that the total amount of probability
on prices above the strike price is unchanged. If the lower extremum does
not increase, as in Figure 4's example, then choose the strike price to be
very low, just above the extremum. The call is then like a bet that the price
will exceed the lower extremum, and the probability of winning that bet is
the same in f and g. If, on the other hand, the upper extremum does not
increase, choose the strike price to be very high, just below the extremum.
Why is this just a necessary condition, and not su±cient? Look back
at Figure 3. In Figure 3, g(x) has more probability at the extremes than
f(x) does{ the probability of each extreme is .25 instead of .20| but it is
not riskier in the conventional sense, because it cannot be reached from f(x)
by a sequence of mean-preserving spreads. If the strike price is 4.5, then
the call's value is higher under distribution g(x), because the outcome x = 5
occurs with probability .25 instead of f(x)'s .20. Vcall(f;4:5) = :20(5¡4:5) =
:10 < Vcall(g;4:5) = :25(5 ¡ 4:5) = :125. If the strike price is 3.5, however,
17the call's value is higher under distribution f(x), because under g(x) the
outcomes x = 4 and x = 5 together occur with probability .25 instead of
.40 and Vcall(f;3:5) = :20(4 ¡ 3:5) + :20(5 ¡ 3:5) = :40 > Vcall(g;3:5) =
:00(4 ¡ 3:5) + :25(5 ¡ 3:5) = :375.
Extremum riskiness already implies that g is not less risky than f, since
more weight is in the far tail of the distribution in g, but it might be that f
and g are not ordered by risk. Although neither conventional nor extremum
riskiness is by itself su±cient to make calls more valuable, in combination
they do yield a su±cient condition, as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Consider two distributions f and g. A su±cient condition
for it to be true that Vcall(g;p) > Vcall(f;p) for any strike price p is that
(a) g is extremum-riskier than f; and
(b) g is riskier than f.
Proof:
From Proposition 1 we know that if condition (b) is true, then Vcall(g;p) ¸
Vcall(f;p), that is, Proposition 3's inequality is true at least weakly. Thus,
all that we need show is that condition (a) makes the inequality strict.
The proof of Proposition 1 showed that if a mean-preserving spread that
made g riskier than f changed probability on three points y1 < y2 < y3, then
if the option's strike price were p · y1 or p ¸ y3, the option's value would be
the same under f as under g.
Since g may be derived from f by a series of mean-preserving spreads,
let y¤
1 be the lowest x value that is changed, and y¤
3 the highest. If the
option's strike price were p · y¤
1 or p ¸ y¤
3, the option's value would be the
same under f as under g. That is the possibility we are trying to rule out.
But condition (a) says that g is extremum riskier. That implies that the
probability of xi less than or equal to x1 increases, so y¤
1 · x1, and that the
probability of xi greater than or equal to xm increases, so y¤
3 ¸ xm. Thus, it
is impossible (since we rule out the riskless options with p = x1 or p = xm)
that p · y¤
1 or p ¸ y¤
3. As a result, the option values cannot be equal for any
18p and it must be that Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p). Q.E.D.
You might ask why I did not write Proposition 3 to say that conditions
(a) and (b) are jointly necessary and su±cient, rather than just su±cient.
If options on g are to be always more valuable than options on f, isn't it
necessary that g be both riskier and extremum- riskier than f? No.
Proposition 4: Consider two distributions f and g. The following two
conditions are not necessary and su±cient for it to be true that Vcall(f;p) <
Vcall(g;p) for any strike price p:
(a) g is extremum-riskier than f; and
(b) g is riskier than f.
Proof: Conditions (a) and (b) are jointly su±cient, as Proposition 3
says. Condition (a) by itself is necessary, as Proposition 2 says. Thus, what
we need to show to prove Proposition 4 is that there exist distributions f and
g such that Condition (b) is violated but nonetheless Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p)
for any p. That is, we must show that g's options are always more valuable,
but g is not riskier than f.
Consider the example in Figure 5. Distribution g is extremum-riskier
than distribution f, but it is not riskier, because it has more probability at
the mean, x = 5 (in fact, f(5) = 0). The distributions f and g cannot be
ordered by risk.
The value of a call option on an asset with density f and strike price
p 2 (2;8) is, from equation (2),
Vcall(f;p) = Maxf0;:25(2 ¡ p)g + Maxf0;:25(4 ¡ p)g + Maxf0;:25(6 ¡ p)g
+Maxf0;:25(8 ¡ p)g
(20)
and the value of a call option on an asset with density g and strike price p is
Vcall(g;p) = Maxf0;:25(1 ¡ p)g + Maxf0;:40(5 ¡ p)g + Maxf0;:30(9 ¡ p)g
(21)
19The possible values of p go from p = 2 to p = 8, where the endpoints are not
possible (as the option would then be always or never exercised). We will
split this up into four intervals and examine each in turn.
Lemma 1: Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p) for p 2 (2;4]:
Proof: Then Vcall(f;p) = :25(4¡p)+ :25(6 ¡p)+:25(8¡p) = :25(18¡p) =
4:5¡:75p: On the other hand, Vcall(g;p) = :40(5¡p)+:30(9¡p) = 4:7¡:70p;
which is greater than 4:5 ¡ :75p:. Thus, g has the more valuable options.
Lemma 2: Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p) for p 2 (4;5]:
Proof: Then Vcall(f;p) = :25(6 ¡ p) + :25(8 ¡ p) = 3:5 ¡ :50p: On the other
hand, Vcall(g;p) = :40(5 ¡ p) + :30(9 ¡ p) = 4:7 ¡ :70p. It is true that
3:5¡:50p < 4:7¡ :70p if :20p < 1:2, which is true if p < 6, and in particular
if p 2 [4;5]. Thus, g has the more valuable options.
Lemma 3: Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p) for p 2 [5;6]:
Proof: Then Vcall(f;p) = :25(6 ¡ p) = :3:5 ¡ :5p: On the other hand,
Vcall(g;p) = :30(9 ¡ p) = 2:7 ¡ :30p: It is true that 3:5 ¡ :5p < 2:7 ¡ :30p if
:8 < :2p, which is true if p > 4, and in particular if p 2 [5;6]. Thus, g has
the more valuable options.
Lemma 4: Vcall(f;p) < Vcall(g;p) for p 2 [6;8):
Proof: Then Vcall(f;p) = :25(8¡p) = 2¡:25p On the other hand, Vcall(g;p) =
:30(9 ¡ p) = 2:7 ¡ :30p: It is true that 2 ¡ :25p < 2:7 ¡ :3p if if p < 14, and
in particular is true if p 2 [6;8]. Thus, g has the more valuable options.
Combining all four cases, we see that for any p 2 (2;8), g has more
valuable options. Q. E. D.
To understand Proposition 4, start with the simpler idea that an op-
tion with price p can be more valuable under distribution g even if g is not
riskier than f. That is true because for some particular p, the call's value
is
Pm
i=j f(xi)(xi ¡ p) for j : xj¡1 < p < xj, which depends on all of the f
20distribution for every xi > p but not on every xi individually. Thus, it is
possible that g(xk) < f(xk) for some particular value of xk > p in a way that
makes it impossible to rank f and g by risk, but for that to be outweighed by
g's greater weight on most high values of xi. Proposition 4 generalizes this to
the idea that an option can be more valuable for any price p even though risk
does not rise. The reason is that we can ¯nd a g that puts enough weight on
its extrema compared to f that g expected values over xi > p will be greater
even if it puts more weight on the mean of x too.
Figure 5: Why Riskiness and Extremum Riskiness Are Not
Necessary for All Options To Increase in Value
Finally, let us leave extremum riskiness and look back to the second new
de¯nition of \riskier": pointwise riskiness. Pointwise riskiness
For many applications, it is convenient to specify a simple su±cient con-
dition for one option to be riskier than another. Indeed, my ¯rst motivation
for this paper was to identify such a su±cient condition in the context of
information acquisition during an auction (see Rasmusen [2004]). Pointwise
riskiness is a su±cient condition that is simple and often plausible. Having
already proved Proposition 3, it is easy to prove this.
21Proposition 5: If g is pointwise riskier than f, then for any p, Vcall(f;p) <
Vcall(g;p).
Proof: If g is pointwise riskier than f, then it is also riskier and extremum
riskier. It is riskier because we can move from f to g by a series of mean-
preserving spreads that take probability away from the middle interval [x;x]
and move it to the extremes. It is extremum riskier because x1 < x and
xm > x, so g puts more probability on x1 and xm than f does. It follows
from Proposition 3, proved above, that calls on g will be more valuable than
calls on f. Q.E.D.
We have, of course, already found one su±cient condition for options on
g to be more valuable than options on f. Proposition 3 said that riskiness
plus extremum riskiness provides a su±cient condition. Proposition 3, in fact,
is a tighter su±cient condition. If g is pointwise riskier than f it is always
both riskier and extremum riskier{ but g can be riskier and extremum riskier
than f without being pointwise riskier. Nonetheless, pointwise riskiness is a
useful concept, because it is simpler and more intuitive than standard plus
extremum riskiness.
Propositions similar to Propositions 2, 3, 4, and 5 are easy to derive for
put options as well as for call options. The propositions do not extend to
exotic options that convey purchase or sale rights over ranges of prices that
do not slice the real line in two (e.g., the right to buy if the price is either
in the interval [3, 5.6] or in [7, 26]). Neither the intuition nor the rigorous
propositions extend to that kind of option, since an exotic option such as in
my parenthetic example can increase in value when probability shifts from
the extremes to the middle, a reduction in risk.
IV. Concluding Remarks
If distribution g is riskier than distribution f, then any call option on
an asset whose value has distribution g will be at least as valuable as the
equivalent option on an asset with distribution f. But the option on g might
22not be more valuable, because the values might be equal. This paper has
developed a necessary condition for all call options on an asset whose value
has distribution g to be strictly more valuable than the equivalent option on
an asset with distribution f, and two su±cient conditions for it, di®ering in
strength and convenience. The necessary condition is that g be \extremum
riskier": it must put more probability on the extreme values of the asset.
One su±cient condition is that g be not only extremum riskier, but also
riskier under the conventional de¯nition of risk{ that g can be reached from
f by a series of mean-preserving spreads. A second su±cient condition, more
restrictive but simpler, is that g be \pointwise riskier": asset values in the
middle of g have higher probability than under f, and asset values outside
the middle have lower probability.
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